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The Nuremberg principles that emerged at the end of World
War II were hailed as a momentous advance toward an effective
rule of law in international society. They affirmed in unmistakable
terms that aggressive war is illegal and that persons responsible for
such wars are guilty of an international crime. These principles
were first expressed in the London agreement of 1945, by which
the leading victorious allied states-the United States, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, and France-established the International
Military Tribunal to try the leaders of Nazi Germany for their role
in planning and waging the war.1 An eleven-power agreement es-
tablished a similar international tribunal in Tokyo to try Japanese
officials and military leaders for their part in the Far Eastern war.2
Both tribunals convicted a number of defendants and imposed
sentences of death or long imprisonment.3 The legal principles
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This article has been written in honor of Professor Bernard Meltzer on his attainment
of emeritus status at The University of Chicago. Professor Meltzer served on the staff of the
Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trial of the Nazi war criminals. In an article on Nurem-
berg written for this Review in 1947, he reflected on the problem of outlawing war in a world
where force had a dominating role. It seems fitting to take this as the theme of this article.
This also gives me a welcome opportunity to acknowledge my debt to Professor Meltzer
for his guidance and stimulation when I served with him in the State Department in 1942-
43. It was not only his intellectual energy and quickness of mind that impressed me then. I
found his combination of sagacity, zest, and idealism to be admirable, especially in combat-
ing bureaucratic apathy and resistance. I was glad to see that a recent scholarly work, The
Abandonment of the Jews, by David Wyman, has brought some of this to public light.
1 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (The London Agreement), August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 3 Bevans 1238, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, rectified by Protocol of October 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1586, 3 Bevans 1286.
2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2675, THE CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (1946).
3 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 365-66 (1947) [here-
inafter cited as Judgment]; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMEs TRIALS 241, 332
(Int'l Conciliation No. 450, 1949). Taylor's survey also includes an account of the 12 Nurem-
berg trials conducted by the U.S. military government in Germany under the authority of an
Allied Control Council law. On the proceedings of the Tokyo trials, see SOLIS HORWITZ, THE
TOKYO TRIAL 475, 572 (Int'l Conciliation No. 465, 1950).
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they applied became known as the Nuremberg principles.
In a unanimous resolution adopted in 1946, the United Na-
tions General Assembly affirmed the Nuremberg principles as ex-
isting in international law.4 No government then or since has ex-
pressed dissent from these principles, and it is almost
inconceivable today that any government would challenge them.
Yet the facts of international life seem to make a mockery of
the Nuremberg principles. Wars and invasions occur with alarming
frequency; armed force is used in many contexts-overthrowing
governments, capturing territory, avenging old wrongs, or coercing
favorable settlement of disputes. Veiled or open threats of violence
provide undercurrents to all interactions between states. States
spend huge sums on munitions; the looming threat of nuclear holo-
caust endangers all states. Our political and social systems are
deeply influenced by the fear of war and a conviction that nothing
can be done to oust armed force as the final arbiter in interna-
tional conflicts.
These facts of life stand in striking contrast to the hopes im-
plicit in the Nuremberg judgments. Not surprisingly, people gener-
ally are skeptical that legal rules can restrain violent acts. At the
same time, awareness of the horrors of war and its threat to human
survival compels us to seek ways of combating the near anarchy of
international society.
This essay examines current efforts in that direction that are
of particular interest for international lawyers and governments.
The questions I discuss were raised or implied in the Nuremberg
cases, but they remain important today in light of increasing gov-
ernment employment of armed force to achieve a multiplicity of
goals.
The article is divided into the following four parts:
I. Rules on Force and Rule-Skepticism
II. Implied Conditions and Changed Circumstances
III. Necessary Self-Defense
IV. Justification of Force for Higher Ends
I. RULES ON FORCE AND RuLE-SKEPTICISM
A. The Nuremberg Trials
A central issue in the Nuremberg trials was whether aggressive
war had been illegal and criminal under international law prior to
I G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
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1945.5 Counsel for the defendants claimed that the principles laid
down in the four-power London agreement had not previously
been customary international law, and that to apply them would
violate the basic juridical postulate prohibiting punishment of a
crime in the absence of a pre-existing law. "Nullum crimen sine
lege, nulla poena sine lege. ''6
The tribunal rejected defense counsel's contention, citing in
particular the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928,
which in 1939 had 63 parties including Germany.7 That treaty con-
demned recourse to war for the solution of international disputes.8
The tribunal also referred to other international declarations (in-
cluding a resolution of the League of Nations, a declaration of a
Pan-American Conference, a protocol on dispute settlement not
yet in force, and a draft treaty on mutual assistance) to support
the conclusion that aggressive war had long been branded as crimi-
nal by the international community.9 These treaty commitments,
the tribunal declared, necessarily postulated the illegality of ag-
gressive war and the criminality of its promoters. In drawing this
implication, the tribunal reasoned that wars of aggression were ille-
gal under general customary international law and not simply a vi-
olation of the treaty in question.10 The judgment discussed the role
of state practices in developing international law and, particularly,
noted how the Hague Conventions on the laws of war had grown
out of and, in turn, become accepted as customary law."
The tribunal considered it important to establish this proposi-
tion, which would move the issue beyond specific treaty terms and
elevate the illegality of aggression to a universal rule. 2 It also
seems plausible that the tribunal found it desirable to emphasize
customary law to rebut defense counsel's contention that aggres-
6 See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1628-
33 (1984).
' Judgment, supra note 3, at 219.
7Id.
8 Kellogg-Briand Pact, August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
9 Judgment, supra note 3, at 221-22.
1" Id. at 220-21 ("The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs
and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition.. . . [I]n many cases
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate reference the principles of
law already existing.").
Id. at 253-54.
12 The tribunal's emphasis on customary law is also underlined by its rather cursory
consideration of the London agreement provision stating that crimes against peace included
wars in violations of international agreements. Id. at 219. While it found this provision rele-
vant to Germany's treaty violations, it did not make this the main ground of the judgment.
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sion could not be a standard of criminal liability because it had not
been defined in any international document.13 By relying on cus-
tomary law, the tribunal could draw an analogy to the historic de-
velopment of the criminal law. Common crimes such as murder,
robbery, and rape were punished by societies long before they were
defined in general terms. 14
In the same sense, the tribunal found it unnecessary to define
aggression. It set forth the historical facts and deemed them proof
enough that the defendants planned, initiated, and waged aggres-
sive war under any conceivable definition of aggression.1 5 More-
over, the absence of a definition did not mean that the accused had
no idea they were doing wrong. The tribunal was convinced that
the Nazi leaders were aware of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and of
other agreements labeling aggressive war as illegal. On that prem-
ise it would have been unreasonable to conclude that the defen-
dants were being prosecuted for an offense that was being applied
retroactively against them, for the rule against retroactivity was in-
tended to protect persons who could not have known of their guilt.
B. The Gap Between Rules and State Practice
Of particular interest in the present context is that the tribu-
nal did not find it necessary to examine any specific state conduct
in order to establish customary practice: it considered the several
declarations already noted to be evidence enough of customary
law.16 It did not ask whether those declarations accorded with the
"constant and uniform practice" of states which international law-
yers consider an essential constitutive element of customary law.17
It did not compare practice and preaching. It took the declarations
as the opinio juris communis of international society without try-
ing to discover the "real" attitudes of states.
A perceptive observer such as Professor Meltzer was bound to
be troubled by this. Writing in this law review'8 soon after the Nu-
13 Id. at 219-22.
"' In a statement to the U.N. General Assembly's Legal Committee, the Netherlands
judge who sat in the Tokyo trial said that "as easily as [a judge] operates with the crime of
'murder' he might operate with the crime of 'aggression.'" Roling, On Aggression, On Inter-
national Criminal Law, On International Criminal Jurisdiction-I, 2 NEDERLANDS TiJD-
SCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 167, 169 (1955).
15 Judgment, supra note 3, at 186-216.
" Id. at 220-22.
See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 4, 38; North
Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 41-45 (especially paragraphs 74-77).
"s Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CH. L. REV. 455
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remberg judgment, he contrasted the declarations and realities. He
commented that "[w]ar in Europe had been almost as natural a
relation as peace," reflecting a "tradition of aggression and its
moral acceptance."' 19 This led him to ask whether condemning ag-
gression as a violation of existing law meant positing "order and
morality where only anarchy and amorality prevail. ' 20 Without re-
ferring to the international law requirement of uniform practice, he
posed the underlying question of whether verbal declarations
might not be mistaken for meaningful standards that governed ac-
tual conduct.21 But after raising these issues, Meltzer concluded by
supporting the tribunal's reliance on "the most solemn, widespread
and unequivocal condemnations of aggression. ' '22 "When a stan-
dard of conduct has been embodied and repeatedly reaffirmed, in
the most solemn and unequivocal international formulations, it
would be a dangerous invitation to anarchy to disavow it on the
basis of doubtful conjectures as to the 'real' state of international
psychology. '2 3
Professor Meltzer characteristically chose his words carefully.
He is surely right to counsel against disavowing states' declarations
against aggression because of "doubtful conjectures" about "inter-
national psychology." But this does not fully answer his own ques-
tion about meaningful standards, nor does it meet the basic doctri-
nal point that practices rather than mere words become customary
law rules. These issues still haunt us. They arise whenever states
use armed force in circumstances inconsistent with the present law
as set forth in the U.N. Charter and the authoritative definition of
aggression adopted by consensus in the U.N. General Assembly of
1974.24
It is not difficult to think of recent cases in which the rule
against the use of force was probably violated. Consider some of
the recent hostilities in: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad,
Falkland Islands, Grenada, Iraq-Iran, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nic-
aragua, Vietnam. In each of these places, foreign states employed
(1947).
19 Id. at 459.
20 Id.
21 Id.
21 Id.
23 Id. at 460.
11 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Aggression Resolution], reprinted in part in L. HENKIN, P. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 915-18 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as CASEBOOK].
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military force for one reason or another, generally claiming legal
justification in the language of the U.N. Charter.26 The most fre-
quent stated ground was self-defense, either individual or "collec-
tive" (i.e., on behalf of a state attacked by others). In some cases, a
government or head of state facing internal or external opposition
was said to have requested the military intervention.26 The state
supplying aid maintained that the force was not used "against the
territorial integrity or political independence" of the requesting
state or in any other manner contrary to the principles of the U.N.
Charter.
The quality of these justifications varies. The U.S. has tended
to provide fuller and more sophisticated legal justifications than
most other countries, probably because Congress and important
sectors of public opinion are concerned about the legitimacy of
American action.2 s For example, the U.S. State Department offered
three justifications for the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25,
1983: (1) the Governor-General of Grenada explicitly requested
U.S. military assistance; (2) the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
States, composed of Grenada and its island neighbors, requested
U.S. help in abating what it perceived as a threat to its member
nations' security; and (3) a state has a right under customary inter-
national law to protect its nationals facing imminent danger of
death in other countries.29
Many countries, in contrast, have limited their claims to brief
and general phrases of Charter terminology and their own version
of the relevant facts. When the Soviet Union sent troops into
Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, it asserted that this action
came in response to that government's "urgent" request for assis-
tance.30 After this justification had been repudiated repeatedly by
the Czechoslovak National Assembly, and was specifically dis-
avowed in a message from the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to
25 U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51 & 42.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 reads as follows: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."
28 As one observer stated after the U.S. action in Grenada, "The American people will
not tolerate continuous illegal conduct." Remarks by Senator Nunn, University of Georgia
Law Day (April 14, 1984).
29 Letter from Davis P. Robinson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Professor Ed-
ward Gordon (Feb. 10, 1984) (outlining U.S. legal position concerning Grenada), reprinted
in JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION 125-29 app. (1984).
30 7 I.L.M. 1283 (1968).
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the Security Council,31 the Soviet Union relied instead on a more
general claim of self-defense under the U.N. Charter.32 Not sur-
prisingly, most outsiders view many of these legal contentions
skeptically, primarily because states, in substantiating their claims,
frequently seem to cite carefully chosen, if not fabricated, sets of
facts. Thus, the legal justifications offered by states are often per-
ceived as rationalizations contrived after the decision to intervene
had been made.
C. The Paradox of Rules
It is a small step from these skeptical reactions to the conclu-
sion that legal principles mean little in practice. At the least, the
law in reality differs from the law on the books. The very fact that
states can advance a legal argument for every use of force is a
ground for skepticism. It brings to mind a well-known "paradox"
of Wittgenstein (which I amend slightly): "No course of action can
be determined by a rule because every course of action can be
made out to conform with every rule."33 This paradox seems espe-
cially pertinent in view of the absence of a compulsory system of
adjudication. The ostensible freedom of states to define the rules
for themselves, particularly where the rules are highly general and
strong political motives govern behavior, builds into a strong case
for rule-skepticism. Hence many are inclined to agree with Ray-
mond Aron that international society is an "anarchical order of
power" in which might makes right.3 4
1. The Core Meaning of the Rules. Strong as the case for
rule-skepticism appears to be, it unduly simplifies the complex in-
teractions between norms and state conduct. To begin with, it is an
exaggeration to consider the Charter rules so indeterminate and
malleable that governments can always make out a plausible case
for the legality of their actions. Of course, like all general rules,
they give rise to problems of interpretation in their application to
concrete situations. They are not free of ambiguity and they may
call for factual appraisals as to which reasonable persons can differ.
S 7 I.L.M. 1294, 1305, 1313 (1968); U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1441, 1 31, 34 (Provisional Rec-
ord) (1968).
32 U.N. Doc. SIP.V.1441, 90, 93 (Provisional Record). To justify its action, the Soviet
Union also announced the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which proclaims that socialist states have a
right to intervene in other socialist states where necessary to meet threats to socialism. 7
I.L.M. 1323 (1968). The doctrine has not been reasserted since that time.
33 LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 201 (1953).
3' Aron, The Anarchical Order of Power, in CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER 25 (S. Hoff-
man ed. 1968).
1986]
The University of Chicago Law Review
One cannot expect them to be applied by computers. Nevertheless,
the rules have a core meaning that governments and legal experts
generally accept. Thus it is perfectly clear that states may not in-
vade others for gain or domination, a principle affirmed in the
judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.
The present rules go beyond this: states may no longer take up
arms to avenge past injustices or to vindicate legal rights.3 5 This is
widely agreed, even though some contemporary writers argue for
broader rights to use force.3 6 Of course, states have the unques-
tioned right to use armed force in response to an armed attack on
them.37 There is some disagreement whether the requirement of an
armed attack has superseded the somewhat broader customary law
right of defense against an imminent attack.3 However, this differ-
ence is narrow if "imminent attack" is strictly construed.
Self-defense must not only be necessary but also proportional
to the offense in its extent, manner, and goal. The criterion of pro-
portionality leaves a broad margin of discretion to a defending
state but it also imposes well-understood limits. Thus, it would un-
doubtedly be disproportionate to bomb cities in response to a fron-
tier raid or to invade and occupy territory of a state because that
state has illegally aided insurgents in a civil war.
The law also clearly allows collective self-defense, so that a
state may aid a victim of actual aggression.39 This right has been
invoked by several countries as a legal basis for their armed inter-
ventions in civil wars where insurgents have been aided by an
outside power.40 A counter-intervention is permissible against a
prior illegal intervention provided it is not disproportionate in
manner and extent.41 However, difficulties do arise in this context.
'" See Schachter, supra note 5, at 1625-27; The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 35.
38 See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 92-134 (1958); AV. THOMAS
& AJ. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION 208-10 (1956).
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
See infra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing Israel-Iraq conflict).
'9 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 51. There are, however, several possible interpretations
of the scope of permissible collective self-defense. The NATO and Warsaw Pacts and the
InterAmerican Rio Treaty are premised on the right of any party to the treaty to come to
the aid of an attacked state whether or not the acting party faces a threat to its security.
See Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self Defence in Modern International Law,
136 RECUEIL DES CouRs 411, 478-83 (1972).
40 Two recent examples are the Soviet Union's claim in regard to its actions in Afghan-
istan and the United States' claim with respect to its activities in Nicaragua.
"I See Resolution of Institut de Droit International on the Principle of Non-Interven-
tion in Civil Wars, 56 ANN. INST. DR. INT'L 544, 549 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Resolution
on Non-Intervention]. John Stuart Mill made the point in 1859: "Intervention to enforce
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The facts are often disputed and sometimes the claim of a prior
illegal intervention has lacked credible evidence.42 In still other
cases, the counter-intervention has been clearly disproportionate. 3
Yet the problems of weighing facts should not be exaggerated: they
make it difficult to apply the agreed rules but they do not mean
that the rules lack content.
In short, it is unwarranted to view the Charter rules as en-
tirely "open-textured," allowing states unlimited latitude to inter-
pret them. The general contours of the rules are clear.
2. Third-Party Determinations. A skeptic may respond that
it hardly matters whether the rules have a core meaning in the
absence of compulsory third-party adjudication of unilateral inter-
pretations. As the Nuremberg tribunal declared in its judgment:
"whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact
aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation
or adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced. '44 The
point has often been made. It is incompatible with the concept of
law that an entity subject to the law should have the final author-
ity to determine whether a legal rule applies to it.
One answer to this line of argument is that third-party judg-
ments are in fact made; self-serving unilateral justifications are not
always accepted by the international community. Whenever a state
has recourse to armed force outside of its territory, the legitimacy
of that action is appraised by other states, organizations, non-gov-
ernmental groups, and individuals. The more formal and promi-
nent judgments issue from the international political organs that
deal with issues of peace and security, notably the U.N. Security
Council and General Assembly. These decisions generally com-
mand state attention. They are more likely to persuade where the
facts are reasonably clear and critical resolutions receive substan-
tial majority support, especially where the majority includes gov-
ernments allied to or generally sympathetic to the impugned
states.4
5
non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent." J.S. Mill, A Few
Words on Non-Intervention, in 21 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 109, 123 (J.
Robson ed. 1984).
42 See, e.g., supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia).
4" For example, invasions by Vietnam of Cambodia, by Syria of Lebanon, and by Libya
of Chad.
44 Judgment, supra note 3, at 208.
" See Schachter, supra note 5, at 1622-23; G.A. Res. 37/37, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/37/P.V. 82 (1983) (condemnation of the Soviet Union for its invasion
of Afghanistan); G.A. Res. 38, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/38/P.V. 43
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But decisions of the U.N. political bodies-or their failure to
decide-should not be considered definitive in every case. These
are political, not judicial bodies. Their members are free to pass on
the issues of legality for whatever reasons they deem appropriate.
Political pressures and "mechanical" bloc voting may detract from
the persuasive authority of those decisions. Thus, the collective
judgments may lack the respect and authority normally associated
with judicial tribunals. Moreover, the judgments of U.N. political
organs are not legally binding except in the rare instances where
they form part of a mandatory decision of the Security Council.46
Still, they remain an important means for the international com-
munity to express its collective opinion of state claims.
Criticism from non-governmental groups may be even more
significant-not because these groups voice an amorphous world
opinion but rather because their particular composition and con-
cerns lend significance to their judgment. Recall, for example, the
criticism by non-Soviet bloc communist parties of the Soviet uses
of force in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1981. 47
The fact that these parties previously had consistently supported
Soviet political positions gave more weight to their subsequent
opposition.
Another important category of unofficial judgments is that of
the international lawyers, especially their academic component.
This is not mere professional conceit. Because of the paucity of
case law and the politicized character of governmental positions,
the expert opinions of legal scholars and their professional bodies
command attention and respect. The views of these experts are
persuasive when they are expressed in reasoned discourse sup-
ported by authority and principle. Moreover, since international
lawyers come from many countries and have diverse approaches,
their opinions have added weight when they coincide and reinforce
each other.48
3. The Political Costs to the Targets of International Cen-
sure. The skeptic may concede these points but still persist in his
(1983) (condemnation of the U.S. for its invasion of Grenada). For a critical comment on the
U.N. resolution and arguments for the U.S. position on Grenada, see J. MOORE, supra note
29. On the unanimous condemnation of Iran for its part in the seizure of American diplo-
matic personnel in Tehran, see Security Council Res. 457, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979).
48 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 12, 14.
17 See, e.g., 7 I.L.M. 1285 (1968) (the Czechoslovak Communist Party condemns the
Soviet Union).
48 See Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 217
(1977); see also TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 173-77 (1983).
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doubts. He can argue that without international enforcement, cen-
sure has no impact on state actions: it remains merely rhetorical
condemnation without sanctions. Law must be more than aspira-
tion or ideal. However, states do in fact strongly object to such
condemnation and will make determined efforts to forestall cen-
sure by the U.N.49 That they do so shows that a condemnation of
illegality by an international organ, even if not binding, is regarded
as detrimental, imposing political costs on the offender. 50 Such
condemnations by large majorities have contributed to transform-
ing the image of a great power from a champion of national inde-
pendence to that of a threat to the sovereignty of weaker states.
One cannot doubt that this transformation of image has negative
political consequences for the state criticized.
Thus, we can plausibly infer that governments consider the
possibility of such censure when they face a decision to use force.
That this frequently happens is suggested by the fact that for vir-
tually every use of force, the responsible state has sought to justify
it under the accepted Charter rules. Though such legal justification
may merely rationalize a decision made for reasons of interest or
power, the felt need of governments to advance a legal argument is
itself a fact of some consequence. The fact that their legal argu-
ments may be rationalizations does not mean they are without in-
fluence. The claims, however hypocritical, have a political object;
they must be believed to serve that purpose and to be credible
they must appear to influence conduct. Hence governments have
good reason to keep from doing what cannot be justified.
Of course these considerations do not add up to an iron law of
rule-governed conduct. States may still decide to violate the law
and face a loss of credibility and other negative consequences. In
most cases, they need not fear that effective collective sanctions
will be imposed by the U.N. or other groups of states. But they are
nevertheless aware that the illicit use of force is not cost-free. Inso-
far as that perception exists, it has an impact on state conduct.
The legal restraints thereby acquire a measure of efficacy; they are
'" See THOMAS FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION chs. 10 & 11 (1985).
50 "The ability of the United States to exert its influence in world affairs in furtherance
of the humane and democratic values we most deeply believe in will be determined in the
long run by the perceived legitimacy of our imposing national power, as well as by that
power itself." Gordon, Bilder, Rovine & Wallace, International Law and The United States
Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAW. 331, 332 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Grenada
Report]; see also Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 314-39 (2d ed. 1979); Christopher,
Introduction, to AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 10-13 (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985); Cutler, The
Right to Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 96, 96-97 (1985).
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not simply aspirations or paper rules.
4. The Basic Need for Rules. We are left then with the polit-
ical scientists and journalists who remain cynical about attempts
"to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments
in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal
rules and restraints."' 51 Their basic hypothesis is that states act out
of national interest, constrained, in the last analysis, only by
power. Not only apparent violations of rules but even compliance
verifies their view, since compliance can also be motivated by the
state's perceived national interest. In short, no matter what a state
does, it must be acting for reasons of interest, not law.
This line of reasoning begs the questions of whether states
consider law-observance generally in their interest and whether
that perceived interest occasionally prevails over other interests.
This is an empirical matter to which no final answer can be given.
However, in considering the reality of rules on force we must not
forget that the distinction between illicit and allowable uses of
force is essential to every legal system. International society re-
quires it no less than national communities. Charles De Visscher, a
past President of the International Court of Justice, stated: "It is
not possible at one and the same time to base international rela-
tions on the independent existence of States and to concede to
each State the sovereign right to take up arms to attack or destroy
that independence." 52 The logic of that proposition underlies the
common interest in maintaining the restraints on force.
II. IMPLIED CONDITIONS AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
It is one thing to conclude that we need some restraints on
force; it is another matter to determine their precise limits. The
existing rules cannot be considered necessary in the philosophical
sense. They have a contingent character in that they depend on
human choices and on the myriad factors conditioning such
choices. The rules may be defended as established law, but that
does not foreclose demands for change, whether by way of reinter-
pretation or explicit revision.
Consideration of these demands for change is particularly
timely: they are now advanced with increasing frequency and in-
tensity. Proponents of change contend at bottom that recent devel-
" See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 94 (1951).
52 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (Cor-
bett trans. 2d ed. 1968).
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opments in international relations have significantly altered the
conditions on which the restrictive Charter rules were based. We
now require new interpretations and new rules, it is argued, to se-
cure minimal order and justice among states. 3 Significantly, no re-
sponsible person proposes abandoning all rules; everyone appears
to recognize the need to limit each state's right to take up arms.
Generally the revisionists seek to broaden the grounds for recourse
to force by individual states without reverting to a Hobbesian state
of nature.
A. Dependency of the Charter Rules on the Effectiveness of
International Law
The case for revision rests on a mix of juridical and political
arguments. First, the existing rules-of the Charter or general cus-
tomary law-were premised on the effective functioning of a collec-
tive security system. As argued by Julius Stone, one of the earliest
and most forceful revisionists, the Charter's renunciation of unilat-
eral force was intended to be "organic[ally] dependen[t] ...on
the effective establishment of collective institutions and meth-
ods."5 4 Since the U.N. collective security system has failed (as
shown by the continued frequency of violent international acts),
states should be released from their unilateral commitments to es-
chew force.5 The critical policy question is then posed: Why
should states abide by the law to their disadvantage when lawless
states violate it with impunity?
Although the question is basically political, the legal argu-
ments are relevant. The legislative history of article 2 of the Char-
ter does not support the notion that effective enforcement of col-
lective security was a prerequisite to renouncing the use of force."
'3 [E]xisting legal norms governing the use of armed force reflect past needs and exper-
iences more than current ones. To the extent . . . that reasonable efforts to counter
insidious forms of aggression, protect human rights, restore civil order or achieve other
legitimate ends do not square with the law[,] ...perhaps the law needs amendment
Grenada Report, supra note 50, at 334.
J. STONE, supra note 36, at 96.
" See, e.g., AN. THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, JR, supra note 36, at 209 ("I]f the collective
organization, through a fault in its organizing instrument, leaves a gap where the use of
force is necessary but the collective organization is impotent to act, then the legal right to
use force must. . . revert back to the members."). But see Grenada Report, supra note 50,
at 362 (rejecting this argument on the ground that "a state which has benefited from the
Charter cannot belatedly interpose the failure of consideration as a ground for invalidating
its consent to be bound by it").
86 See, e.g., DJURA NINCI6, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE
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True, the Charter's drafters must have hoped that the Security
Council and other relevant U.N. organs would obviate individual
recourse to force. But they were realistic enough to recognize that
this might not be achieved; that is precisely why they preserved
the right of self-defense to respond to armed attack.57 Force could
meet force but, unless authorized by the Security Council,5" force
could not answer a non-forcible deprivation of rights. It is hardly
plausible to infer from these provisions that the failure to prevent
illegal force now allows an individual state to use force freely. No
evidence or logical reason supports the assumption that the draft-
ers or the signatory governments intended this radical result.
Rather, widespread affirmation of the rules on force as jus cogens,
peremptory norms of customary law,59 shows that states regard
those rules as legally independent of the proper functioning of
U.N. organs.
B. Necessity of Force to Safeguard Legal Rights
The political case for revision includes another argument: if
individual force is limited to self-defense, states may have no ade-
quate means of resisting violations of their legal rights.6 0 States
often cannot obtain satisfaction through international judicial or
political processes, yet they are barred from resorting to force un-
less they are attacked (or facing imminent danger of attack).61
This does not leave states without remedies. Aggrieved states
may employ economic and other non-military countermeasures6 2 to
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 72, 76-77 (1970) (guarantees of territorial integrity in arti-
cle 2(4) were not intended to limit the article's broad prohibition of self-help measures).
57 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
" Id. arts. 36, 39-42.
59 See infra note 72.
so J. STONE, supra note 36, at 98-101.
01 The Charter does, however, give the Security Council the power to authorize eco-
nomic sanctions against errant states, including "complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communi-
cation, and the severance of diplomatic relations." U.N. CHARTER art. 41. This power has
been used only infrequently.
02 See Schachter, Self-Help in International Law, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 231 (1984); see also
ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES passim (1984).
It is worth noting that the line between self-help and self-defense has never been en-
tirely clear in customary law. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCPLE S OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-17,
58-62 (1952). Prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter, many writers and governments
thought that the right of self-defense applied not only to an actual or threatened physical
attack on the state or its instrumentalities but also to violations of legally protected inter-
ests. See, e.g., D. NINCIt, supra note 56, at 53 (explaining rationale of the "war as a sanc-
tion" theory). Some writers have distinguished self-defense from the wider category of self-
help by limiting self-defense to responses to violations of rights essential to the security and
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respond to illegal action. 3 In many cases threats or actions to sus-
pend treaty benefits, fishing rights, imports, immigration, or air
transit have succeeded in bringing violations to an end.64 Of course
these measures do not always redress the wrong. Even powerful
countries such as the U.S. have occasionally imposed economic
sanctions without conspicuous success. 5
independence of the state. See DEREK W. BowETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
270-71 (1958); Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245,
251 n.21 (1976). Even when so limited, self-defense would allow forcible responses to a wide
range of unlawful and injurious acts by others. The argument of some political theorists that
"aggression" must be understood as contrary to "peace-with-rights," see MICHAEL WALZER,
JUST AND UNJUST WARS 51 (1977); T. NARDIN, supra note 48, at 284, and that therefore a
state using force to defend its rights (even when not attacked) is upholding the common
rules of the society of states, has the same flaws as the argument that article 51 of the
Charter preserves the "inherent right" of self-defense, which is discussed infra at text ac-
companying notes 83-86. See WILLIAM VINCENT O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED
WAR 38-55, 67-70 (1981); WAR, MORALITY AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 232-487 (M.M.
Wakin ed. 1979). The theorists' position begs the question since the issue is whether the
legal limits on force, including article 51, are part of the common rules. If they are, then one
cannot override them in order to safeguard other legal rights.
'3 States occasionally also use or threaten non-military coercion for political ends such
as overthrowing a state's regime or effecting massive changes in its policies. For example,
Arab states continue to implement a coercive multi-level boycott designed to destroy the
state of Israel. See Joyner, The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in Interna-
tional Law: Policy, Place and Practice, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 216-20 (1984);
Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68 Am. J.
INT'L L. 591, 592-93 (1974). Non-military coercion for these purposes is arguably illegal be-
cause it is aimed at subordinating the target state's sovereign rights to the will of the coerc-
ing state. See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Annex 3 (Agenda Item 107) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/6220
(1965); CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES arts. 15-16; see also Bowett,
supra note 62, at 249 (drawing a distinction between allowable and illicit "economic coer-
cion" based on whether the state's motive is economic or political: "once a State is allowed
to coerce in the furtherance of its political goals, there is little point even in attempting
legally to restrict economic coercion").
Some commentators have gone so far as to contend that economic action of such inten-
sity and magnitude would justify forcible self-defense by the target state, and collective
defense by its allies. See Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1985). I disagree. Even egregious economic aggression,
whether or not illegal, does not constitute an armed attack or a use of force in the Charter
sense. Allowing forcible reprisal to non-military coercion would broaden the grounds for use
of force to an intolerable degree.
See, generally, G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHorr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
(1985).
"s When armed conflict broke out between the United Kingdom and Argentina over
the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982, the U.S. first attempted to mediate the dispute.
When this failed, it imposed several sanctions against Argentina: "(1) suspension of all mili-
tary exports and security assistance to Argentina; (2) withholding of certification of Argen-
tine eligibility for military sales; (3) suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and
guarantees; and (4) suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees." Acevedo,
The U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 323, 326 (1984). Despite the seriousness of the measures taken, they had no appreci-
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Still, the failure of self-help and international institutions to
provide adequate remedies for breaches of legal rights does not im-
pugn the efficacy of the Charter's collective machinery. That ma-
chinery does not purport to safeguard legal rights: it was meant to
ensure peace and security.6  Optional judicial machinery is avail-
able for legal disputes, and a preamble in the Charter expresses the
intent to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
law could be maintained. But no language of the Charter supports
the view that the failure to safeguard legal rights should nullify the
renunciation of individual force. And the consequence of such a
view-return to the near anarchy of pre-Charter international soci-
ety-is too drastic to have been what states contemplated when
the Charter was adopted.67
C. Theories of Changed Circumstances
Two other legal theories support the view that the rules on
force have been abrogated by developments in international rela-
tions. One is the general requirement of reciprocity.68 Widespread
violations by states should, in law, release others from the duty to
comply. This theory developed by analogy to the right of one
treaty party to suspend the treaty between it and a violator for a
violation especially affecting that party.69 Thus it has been sug-
able effect on the course of the war.
See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 15-16 (1950).
87 The International Court of Justice had occasion to pass judgment on this issue when
Britain used forcible self-help to vindicate its right of passage through the Corfu Channel.
The court considered Britain's claim of right unacceptable, observing that a right to use
armed force "in the cause of justice" would "be reserved for the most powerful states and
might easily lead to perverting the administration of justice itself. . . . [A] policy of force
such as [this] has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and ... cannot, whatever be
the defects in international organization, find a place in international law." The Corfu
Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35.
" Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick declared in April, 1984: "The first principle of the
law is the equal application of the law. Unilateral compliance with the Charter's principles
of nonintervention and non-use of force may make sense in some specific isolated instances,
but are hardly a sound basis for either United States policy or for international peace and
stability." Address by Ambassador Kirkpatrick to the American Society of International
Law 16 (Apr. 1984) (not yet published; copy on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review); see also JuLIus STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER 54-55 (1984). For a forceful rebut-
tal of Kirkpatrick, see Gardner, Sovereignty and Intervention: A Challenge of Law-Making
for the Industrialized Democracies, 35 TRIALOGUE 3 (1984).
An interesting discussion of the role of reciprocity in international law may be found in
Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society,,50 U. Cm. L. REv. 567 (1983).
89 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done on May 23, 1969, art. 60, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Conven-
tion]. Apart from the right of suspension, a party has the right to refuse to perform an
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gested that serious violations of article 2(4) by the Soviet Union
would entitle the United States, if it were especially affected, to
suspend its obligations to the U.S.S.R.7 0 An even broader conten-
tion is that Charter breaches have so radically changed the posi-
tion of all states that any party may now invoke those violations as
a ground for suspending its obligations. 71 Although these legal
principles (contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties) cannot be denied, their application to these issues is by
no means clear. Significantly, no state has invoked another state's
breach of article 2(4) as a legal reason to abrogate the Charter
rules. And as we noted, article 2(4) is the exemplary case of a pe-
remptory norm (jus cogens). 2 Moreover, the Charter stipulates
that its obligations prevail over those of any other agreement.73
Theoretically the parties to the Charter may bring it to an end but
obviously no present disposition exists to do that.
The Charter provides for legal responses to a breach of article
2(4)-most importantly for the right of self-defense in case of an
armed attack.74 If self-defense is not permissible under the circum-
obligation corresponding to the obligation violated by the other party. The applicable cus-
tomary law principle is known as inadimplenti non est adimplendum. See ZOLLER, supra
note 62, at 14-27.
70 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 68, at 17 ("We cannot permit. . . ourselves to be bound
to unilateral renunciation of rights which do in fact exist under the Charter.").
For a political argument to the same effect, see NORMAN PODHORETz, THE PRESENT DAN-
GER 39-42, 96-101 (1980). Eugene Rostow concludes that in view of Soviet and other viola-
tions of article 2(4), it is impossible to determine whether that article "is an operative legal
norm." Rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 286, 290 (1985). For the contrary U.S. State Department position, see Mem-
orandum of R.B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the State Department, quoted in Nash, Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 418,
418-20 (1980).
71 See Vienna Convention, supra note 69, art. 60, para. 2(c). This provision in the Vi-
enna Convention is a carefully circumscribed codification of the customary law doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus, the principle that treaty obligations may "terminate when a change
occurs in those circumstances which existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and
whose continuance formed, according to the intention or wills of the parties, a condition of
the continuing validity of the treaty." Hill, The Doctrine of "Rebus Sic Stantibus" in Inter-
national Law, U. Mo. STUD., July 1, 1934, at 8; see also L. HENKiN, supra note 50, at 137-38;
cf. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978) (codifying the common-law contract doctrine of frustration or com-
mercial impracticability).
72 The United States has taken the legal position that article 2(4) is a peremptory
norm from which no derogation by treaty is permitted. See Memorandum of R.B. Owen,
supra note 70, at 418-20.
73 U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
71 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
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stances, an injured state (or indeed any state) may bring the viola-
tion to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assem-
bly.75 Or, the International Court of Justice may be seized of the
case if a jurisdictional basis is available under its statute. That
these remedies may not effectively redress the violation evidences
the system's weakness. But a legal system's failure to prevent or
punish wrongs by some entities does not entitle all the others to
violate a basic obligation.
In stating this conclusion, I must also note its limits. Persis-
tent serious violations by one party may erode the minimum level
of mutuality required to maintain observance by others. Particu-
larly in adversary relations between the superpowers, reasonable
reciprocity in the use of force is a political necessity. But this
should not become a game of tit-for-tat, in which violation by one
allows a reciprocal violation by the other. The rules on use of force
allow for legitimate responses to aggression; they do not permit re-
ciprocal law-breaking.
A related argument is based on state conduct. Some commen-
tators contend that the widespread and consistent violations of ar-
ticle 2(4) constitute practice sufficient to supersede the Charter
rules and their customary law counterpart.7 6 This argument is no
more convincing than the assertion that if a large number of rapes
and murders are not punished, the criminal laws are supplanted
and legal restraints disappear for everyone.
Although it is reasonably easy to determine when crimes such
as murder have been committed, state conduct in the international
field involves relatively few clear violations. Aggressive wars similar
to the Nazi and Japanese invasions are rare. Most allegedly illegal
uses of force arise out of armed interventions in situations involv-
ing charges and counter-charges of prior illegalities and aggressive
intent. Certainly an impartial tribunal would find culpability in
some of these cases. But we must remember that hundreds of po-
litical conflicts exist, and many if not most actions taken by states
do not constitute illegal uses of force. Therefore, to conclude that
some violations constitute "practice accepted as law" gives "prac-
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Char-
ter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
71 U.N. CHARTER art. 35, para. 1.
7' See, e.g., Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use
of Force by States, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); Rostow, supra note 70, at 287-88.
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tice" a peculiar meaning, quite different from "widespread and
uniform" usage. Moreover, such violations as do occur are not "ac-
cepted as law." On the contrary, in virtually every case one state's
use of force has been condemned by large numbers of states as
violating existing fundamental law.7
This agreement on the rules' fundamental character takes us
to the heart of the matter. When a principle is repeatedly and
unanimously declared to be a basic legal rule from which no dero-
gation is allowed, even numerous violations do not become state
practice constitutive of a new rule. Contrary usage alone should
not terminate a principle that states have strongly affirmed to be a
condition necessary for order. Infringements of existing rules re-
flect expediency and political motives: it would make nonsense of
customary law to treat them as repealing an accepted basic obliga-
tion. 8 No state has ever suggested that violations of article 2(4)
have opened the door to free use of force. Nor have international
lawyers (with a few ambiguous exceptions) supported so radical a
conclusion.
It is not my purpose here to argue that the Charter rules, or
their customary law counterparts, are immutable. We cannot ex-
clude the possibility that new configurations of power and altered
psychological attitudes will wreak a fundamental change in the
state system. Some envisage a single world authority, others a
hegemonial condominium, and still others a basic shift of authority
to non-territorial entities. If such a change occurs in one form or
another, the rules governing force will change correspondingly. But
with the existing balance of power and strong nationalist loyalties,
the basic Charter principles themselves are unlikely to change.
However, pressures for loosening the restraints on the use of force
in some situations are likely to increase. They call for analysis.
III. NECESSARY SELF-DEFENSE
A. Limits on Defense
When states resort to armed force these days, they most com-
monly claim self-defense, either individual or collective, as their
legal justification. Under the U.N. Charter it is clear that self-de-
fense is legitimate "if an armed attack occurs. 79 The necessity of
7 See JOHN MuRPHY, THE UNTED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF VIOLENCE 125-26
(1982); see also EDWIN HoYT, LAW AND FORCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (1985).
78 See C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 52, at 156-57.
7 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, quoted in full supra at note 74.
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defense in this situation is taken for granted.
The question becomes more complicated when the armed at-
tack has succeeded in seizing territory and some time has elapsed.
Has a state a continuing right to self-defense to recover territory
unlawfully taken by armed force? Once the emergency of an armed
attack has ended, a victim of aggression can reasonably be required
to seek and exhaust all avenues of peaceful settlement. But if such
avenues prove futile, is self-defense then "necessary"?
I suggest that the idea of self-defense contains a temporal ele-
ment. It refers to a response made close in time to an attack or
imminent threat. Without that limitation, self-defense would sanc-
tion armed attacks for countless prior acts of aggression and con-
quest. It would completely swallow up the basic rule against using
force. The difficulty of defining a precise time limit-a statute of
limitations, as it were-does not impugn the basic idea. In most
cases irredentist demands for lost territory or claims for restora-
tion of the status quo ante are based on attacks that occurred
many years or even decades ago.80 To extend self-defense to such
cases is to stretch the notion of defense far beyond its basic
meaning.8l
An additional requirement of proportionality is linked to ne-
cessity: acts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim
the necessity provoking them. This definition leaves room for dif-
ferences in particular cases but there is no mistaking its core
meaning. Security Council decisions have condemned defensive ac-
tion that greatly exceeded the provocation (as measured by scale of
\ weaponry and relative casualties) as illegal reprisals rather than le-
gitimate self-defense. s2 It seems reasonable, however, to allow an
attack victim to retaliate with force beyond the immediate area of
attack when it has good reason to expect further attacks from the
same source. Such action would not be merely "anticipatory" since
prior attacks took place; nor would it be a reprisal inasmuch as its
prime motive is protective, not punitive.
B. Proposed Expansions
The most controversial question is whether self-defense may
extend to situations not involving armed attack. It has been argued
o For example, see the Argentine statement on its use of force in the Malvinas (Falk-
land Islands), 37 U.N. GAOR (51st meeting) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/37/353 (1982).
81 See Schachter, supra note 5, at 1627-28.
82 See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 33-
36 (1972).
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that Charter article 51 does not say that an armed attack is always
required. Some scholars infer from this that the drafters of article
51 did not intend to impair the customary law "inherent right" of
defense."' Despite this ingenious argument, most commentators
agree that article 51 defines and limits self-defense to cases of
armed attack."4 To treat that phrase as only a "hypothesis" or an I
example of one aspect of self-defense does not make much sense of
the text or the intent to impose limits on force.
Whatever the intended meaning of article 51, most U.N. mem-
bers tend to favor the more restrictive interpretation.8 5 They fear
that deletion of the armed attack requirement and reliance on an
"inherent right" undefined in customary law would so expand self-
defense as to eliminate virtually all restraints on force. "Armed at-
tack" is a factual, objective condition; it can generally be verified.
In contrast, the "inherent right" is open to subjective interpre-
tation. Customary law offers few firm guidelines-understandably,
since war itself was not considered illegal for many centuries. His-
tory abounds with examples of self-defense claims serving as pre-
texts for aggressive acts. For example, Germany and Japan con-
tended that their military actions leading to World War II were
defensive responses to actions by others aimed at denying them
their rightful territorial and economic claims.8 ' The Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals had no difficulty rejecting these arguments in
light of the evidence on intent to dominate and expand. But the
fact that self-defense could be claimed (and probably believed by
many German and Japanese people) showed how important it was
to limit and define the grounds for its exercise.
Accepting the need for limits on self-defense does not negate
the contention that the armed attack requirement is too rigid. One
may grant that the Charter restricts self-defense to cases of armed
attack, yet conclude that a strict application of that requirement
does not satisfy present perceptions of necessary defense. Several
situations raise this issue:
83 See D. Bowm'r, supra note 62, at 187-93; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-44 (1961). But see H. KFLSEN, supra note 62, at 58-62;
see also L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 141-45 (discussing the importance that the drafters of
article 51 attached to the phrase "if an armed attack occurs").
84 The International Law Commission, after a survey of writers in many countries, con-
cluded that the majority favor the restrictive view. See Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 52-53 & nn.174-75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1/pt.2.
$I See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE PO-
LITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 167-230 (1963).
86 See Judgment, supra note 3, at 191, 194, 206-15; S. HoRwrrz, supra note 3.
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1) Credible threats of force by hostile states;
2) "Indirect aggression"-instigating or aiding subversive
and armed activities to overthrow the regime of another state;
3) Foreign state intervention in civil strife by providing
arms and personnel to one side;
4) Terrorist activities against a state's nationals, espe-
cially seizure of hostages whom the territorial sovereign is un-
able or unwilling to protect.17
In each of these situations, the injured state may reasonably be-
lieve that non-forcible measures cannot provide adequate redress.
Hence it will see armed force as necessary. Also, since the injured
state may have insufficient military strength for self-defense, it
probably will seek outside aid for collective self-defense. In this
situation, states not themselves injured may also claim self-defense
though no state suffered an actual armed attack.
To deal adequately with these situations would require far
more space than this article allows. However, a brief summary of
the considerations pertinent to each case may be of interest.
1. Threats of Force and Anticipatory Defense. The Nurem-
berg and Tokyo trials emphasized the significance of Germany's
and Japan's planning and preparation for war. Many people today
believe that the threatened powers and their allies could have pre-
vented the war by defensive action. This line of reasoning suggests
that anticipatory defense may be warranted against a state that
credibly threatens war by stockpiling armaments and expressing
hostile intent.
The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 presented a variant of this
situation. The U.S. saw the installation of missiles in Cuba as a
threat, and they responded with a blockade implicitly involving a
use of force. Although the U.S. perceived its actions as a defensive
response, it officially justified the blockade by pointing to an ex
post facto "authorization" by the Organization of American
States." By not asserting a legal self-defense claim, the U.S.
sought to avoid a reciprocal claim that U.S. missile bases near the
Soviet Union were unlawful and justified Soviet armed response.
On the other hand, Israel asserted self-defense when it de-
stroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor, citing Iraq's declared state of war
87 This list of situations to which commentators propose extending the self-defense ex-
ception is not exhaustive, but illustrative. See Schachter, supra note 5, at 1633-45.
" See 4 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 523-24 (1965); see also
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MissmE CRISIS 41-68 (1974); L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 227-
31.
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against Israel and the actual menace of a reactor capable of pro-
ducing nuclear weapons.8 9 In the U.N. debates on this action, most
states rejected Israel's contention because the reactor in question
was devoted to peaceful uses and they viewed the possibility of its
conversion to military use as only a remote threat to Israel.9" Inter-
estingly, in the debates some delegates referred favorably to Daniel
Webster's formulation in the Caroline case of a right to self-de-
fense where an attack is imminent. In Webster's eloquent phrase, a
state has a right to self-defense prior to an armed attack only when
the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.""1
Some hold that the Caroline principle still leaves too much
latitude for a state to use force prior to an actual attack.2 Others
fear that it takes inadequate account of a build-up of
arms-especially nuclear missiles-that could on first strike de-
stroy a victim's defensive capability.9 3 Both concerns are under-
standable. They reveal the inability of a general principle to cap-
ture the full dimensions of the problem of dangerous threats. We
need specific legal regimes setting limits on force and providing
means of verification. Some such regimes exist in treaties and by
informal arrangements: these and future agreements may provide a
blueprint for arms controls."'
89 See D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
584 (1983); Mallison & Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense? 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 435-37 (1982).
90 See 36 U.N. SCOR (2285-88th mtg.) passim; U.N. Docs. S/P.V.2285-89 (1981).
" 2 JOHN BAssETr MOORE:, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); see also
CASEBOOK, supra note 24, at 890-91.
" See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 50, at 141-45.
'3 See, e.g., WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
259-60 (1964); Schachter, supra note 5, at 1633-35; Singh, The Right of Self-Defence in
Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 5 INDIAN Y.B. OF INT'L AFF. 3 (1956).
"' Existing treaties include those limiting areas in which nuclear weapons can be em-
ployed, see, e.g., Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1968, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205; those establishing regional nuclear-free zones, prohibiting proliferation, and
limiting size and number of weapons, see, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161;
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. 7503; those providing for emergency communication and
notification of dangerous situations (U.S.-U.S.S.R bilateral treaties); and those providing for
international inspection of nuclear facilities (International Atomic Energy Agency). Future
arrangements being considered in intergovernmental negotiations include exchanges of de-
tailed military information, advance notification of military movements, reports on military
expenditures, and measures for inspection and verification. Detailed proposals on these lines
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On the level of principle, it makes sense to support a norm
that opposes the preemptive resort to force but acknowledges its
necessity when an attack is so immediate and massive as to make
it absurd to demand that the target state await the actual attack
before taking defensive action. Webster's statement in the Caro-
line case is probably the only acceptable formulation at the pre-
sent time to meet this situation.
2. Indirect Aggression. States generally agree that it violates
article 2(4) to support armed activities or subversive infiltration to
overthrow a regime in another state. The regime attacked may of
course take armed action in its territory. May it also use force
against the state supporting the hostile activities, and may third
states attack that state as part of a collective defense arrange-
ment? Should a line be drawn between support of armed activities
and an armed attack within the meaning of article 51?
The latter issue arose in the Nicaragua-U.S. dispute.95 The
U.S. contended that Nicaragua's provision of war mat6riel and
technical aid to El Salvadoran insurgents constituted an armed at-
tack on El Salvador, allowing that state and others to attack Nica-
ragua in collective self-defense. 96 Nicaragua maintained that such
aid-whether legal or not-fell short of an armed attack and con-
sequently did not justify armed defense. 97 More particularly, Nica-
ragua asserted that its aid did not legally warrant U.S. support
through arms and training of the "contras" fighting against the
Nicaraguan regime.9"
Although the U.N. has condemned indirect aggression as ille-
gal, most states have been reluctant to label it as "aggression"
within the definition adopted by the General Assembly in 1974.91
Extending the scope of "aggression," they fear, would expand the
right of self-defense. Memories still remain of armed interventions
were made in 1985 by European governments and by the United States to the Conference
on Confidence-Building and Disarmament established pursuant to the Helsinki Final Act of
1975. The draft Contadora agreement for Central America also includes provisions for limits
and verification in regard to armaments.
9 At the time of writing, the International Court of Justice has not decided the Nica-
ragua-U.S. case. The positions of the two governments on the merits were indicated in the
Court's Order of May 10, 1984, and more fully in Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 169, 191-99 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 191-92.
97 Id. at 190-91, 193.
Is Id. at 170-72 (majority opinion); id. at 193 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
99 See Aggression Resolution, supra note 24.
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on the pretext of combating alleged illegal acts.100 On the other
hand, when armed guerrillas are supported by an outside state, the
aggrieved state may reasonably view that outside state as the
source of an armed attack even if the latter's armed forces are not
directly engaged. The aggrieved state's only effective defense may
be collective military action against the indirect aggressor. It does
not seem unreasonable to interpret "armed attack" to cover the
indirect but substantial support of military action directed against
a government. 1' 1 Accordingly it would not only be illegal for a state
to finance insurgent movements or to allow its territory to be used
for organizing and training armed opposition movements, but such
tactics would open that state to an armed defensive action by or on
behalf of the victim of the indirect aggression.
3. Intervention in Civil Strife. It is well established that a
state acts illegally by sending armed forces or mat6riel to support
an insurgency. If its action falls within the definition of armed at-
tack, both the attacked state and its allies may employ armed de-
fense against the intervening state. In short, counter-intervention
in civil strife may be an exercise of colective self-defense.
These rules are universally accepted where the illegal inter-
vention occurs on the side of the insurgency. In addition, many
legal scholars (and some U.N. resolutions, by implication) support
the proposition that direct or indirect armed intervention on either
side in a civil war is illegal. 0 2 Under article 2(4) intervention con-
stitutes a use of force "against the political independence" of the
state in question because it interferes with its people's right to de-
termine their own political destiny. Consequently, collective self-
defense could allow a state to give military aid in a civil war if
another foreign power is already giving military aid to the opposite
side. 03
On its view of the facts, Nicaragua could argue that these
principles justify its "counter-intervention" in El Salvador. The
U.S., which takes the position that the Sandinista regime has ille-
gally intervened in El Salvador, could claim a collective self-de-
100 See E. HoYr, supra note 77, at 19 (discussing various covert interventions by the
United States and the Soviet Union since World War II).
101 See Resolution on Non-Intervention, supra note 41; see also LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN
THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1974) (especially the essays by Moore and Bowett and
the comments by Falk, Farer, and Sohn) [hereinafter cited as CPvL WAR].
101 See Resolution on Non-Intervention, supra note 41; see also Moore, Toward an Ap-
plied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, and Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories
of Intervention and Self-Defense, in CIVL WAR, supra note 101, at 26, 41-46.
103 See Schachter, supra note 5, at 1641-42.
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fense right to attack licaragua, directly or indirectly. This issue
may be decided by the International Court of Justice in the case
now before the court.
This position on defensive counter-intervention ignores the
ideological stamp of the regime or insurgency involved in the con-
flict. The principle is neutral as between democratic and
nondemocratic governments. However, one commentator argues
that counter-intervention should only be permitted on the side of a
party (whether government or insurgency) that supports self-deter-
mination and popular rule.10 4 In other words, counter-intervention
based on collective self-defense should be in accord with the basic
principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 1 1 Thus, collective self-defense would have a moral
legitimacy beyond its role as a sanction against a prior illicit
intervention.
Under this view, the initial intervention remains illegal but
counter-intervention would be permissible against a party that vio-
lates principles of self-rule and human rights. However, such a rule
would be very imprecise in application. Most governments facing
popular revolt violate those principles, and the insurgents invaria-
bly assert their democratic aims. Thus, aid to insurgents, while il-
licit in theory, could be freely rendered since it could not be coun-
tered with aid to the repressive government. Conversely,
insurgencies may be labeled "totalitarian" by unsympathetic ob-
servers. If that occurred, aid to insurgents could be attacked as il-
legal even if it would otherwise be justified as a counter-
intervention.
Adopting a standard based on the ideological position of a
particular government or faction would create serious difficulties.
Even the democracies of Europe often differ with the U.S. about
the political tendency of any particular group. This indicates how
difficult it would be to reach consensus on the legality of a counter-
intervention. The problematic nature of the inquiry should en-
courage us to pause before adopting such a test.
4. Terrorism and the Taking of Hostages. May a state whose
nationals have been seized by terrorists and held as hostages, or
threatened with death, use armed force io rescue them? This issue
has been raised with increasing frequency as seizure of hostages
becomes ever more the favorite tactic of terrorist groups. Generally
speaking, a state has no right to invade a foreign state to rescue or
104 Cutler, supra note 50, at 106-09.
105 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
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protect its nationals who are considered to be held unlawfully by
that state or by private persons. 10 6 This proposition also holds
where a state fails to protect a foreign national from criminal acts
or injuries by private persons in that country. A government may
strongly protest a national's arbitrary detention or inhumane treat-
ment in prison, but it must have recourse to available diplomatic
and possibly judicial procedures. The government may also impose
non-military sanctions on the state that shirked its obligations
under international law.
In some situations, however, such as the Israeli hostages held
at Entebbe Airport or the American hostages held in Tehran, when
lives are in imminent danger, a good case exists for an exercise of
self-defense through a rescue attempt.10 7 Such attempts must be
limited to the rescue and must not serve as a basis for political
pressure or reprisal.
A more controversial question concerns a state's use of force to
apprehend alleged terrorists who are within another state's juris-
diction or control. This issue was raised dramatically in 1985. Four
U.S. military planes intercepted an Egyptian aircraft flying over
the Mediterranean Sea, compelling it to change course and land in
106 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
§§ 431-432 (Tentative Draft 1985).
107 In both the Entebbe and Iranian situations, the hostages were seized and held as
part of a political action against the state of their nationality. The attack on the individuals
was clearly meant as an attack on their government. The territorial state was unwilling to
rescue them and in fact supported the seizure. The hostages were believed to be in immi-
nent peril of death. On the Israeli mission to free the hostages at Entebbe, see Boyle, The
Entebbe Hostages Crisis, 22 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 199 (1982), and Paust, Entebbe and Self-
Help: The Israeli Response to Terrorism, 2 FLETCHER FORUM 86 (1978).
On these facts, the U.S. representative at the U.N. Security Council debate advanced a
legal justification for the Entebbe rescue action. He conceded that the rescue action violated
Uganda's territorial integrity and would normally be illegal. But he went on to say.
[T]here is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection of one's own
nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in
whose territory they are located either is unwilling or unable to protect them. The
right, flowing from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is neces-
sary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury.
Statement of Ambassador Scranton, 1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 150-51.
This statement follows from Sir Humphrey Waldock's 1952 formulation of principles on
the use of force. See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 REcuEm DES CouRs 451, 467 (1952). The stringent conditions for
intervention are as follows: The action must be for rescue and protection, not punitive repri-
sal, and it must not intervene beyond its necessity; an action legal in its inception would
become illegal if prolonged or used for political pressure. See Schachter, International Law
in the Hostage Crisis: Implications for Future Cases, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 325
(P. Kreisberg ed. 1985); see also Schachter, supra note 5, at 1631-32 (discussing the Gre-
nada incident).
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Italy, so that the accused persons on board would be prosecuted
for seizing an Italian vessel, taking hostages, and murdering an
American passenger. The U.S. considered the action necessary be-
cause the alleged terrorists were presumably being taken to a desti-
nation where their offense would go unpunished.
Neither the President nor any senior U.S. official offered an
explicit legal ground for the interception of the Egyptian plane.10 8
The implicit premise of the U.S. action appeared to be that any
state (or at least any specially affected state) could use force to
obtain custody of terrorists when the state having control of them
was unwilling or unable to bring them before a court of justice. No
one referred at the time to the possible relevance of either Charter
article 2(4) or of rules in civil aviation treaties prohibiting inter-
ceptions of civilian aircraft over the high seas.10 9 The overriding
consideration expressed by the President was that "there must be
no asylum for terrorists or terrorism."'" 0
It might have been argued that Egypt had violated a new (or
nascent) international obligation of all states to prosecute accused
terrorists or takers of hostages or to extradite them to countries
where they would be subject to prosecution. But even if that pro-
position were sustainable on the law and facts, it does not follow
that another state may use or threaten force against a civilian
plane outside that state's jurisdiction. That situation is clearly dis-
tinct from the seizure of a "pirate ship or aircraft" (or a ship seized
by pirates and under their control). In the latter case, as long as
the vessel or aircraft is on the high seas or anywhere else outside
every state's jurisdiction, any state may take such action and arrest
the wrongdoers on board."' However, the fact that a state's vessel
or plane is carrying "pirates" (or terrorists) and intends to release
them does not transform the vessel or plane into a "pirate" ship or
aircraft.
Strong public revulsion against terrorism has spurred in-
creased demands for concerned states to deny all sanctuary to ter-
rorists. Proposals have been made that the United States (and pre-
108 See Terrorists Seize Cruise Ship in Mediterranean, 85 Dze'T ST. BULL. 74-81 (Dec.
1985).
109 See Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77
Am. J. INT'L L., 490, 513-19 (1983).
110 White House Statement of October 9, 1985, reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74
(Dec. 1985).
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982),
reprinted in 21 LL.M. 1261, 1289 (1981). This article repeats article 19 of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the High Seas and is declaratory of customary law.
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sumably any capable state) be permitted to seize accused terrorists
from within states which fail to bring them to justice. Moreover,
under these proposals every state could determine unilaterally its
right to take action against a person it believes guilty. This of
course represents a radical departure from the basic rule of territo-
rial sovereignty. Thus one can safely predict that states generally
will reject these proposals.
Such far-reaching revision of the rules may not even be neces-
sary. The existing framework of law provides a remedy in the in-
ternational conventions dealing with offenses related to terrorism.
Each state party to those conventions undertakes to treat a terror-
ist offense as a serious crime, and either to prosecute the offenders
itself or to extradite them to a state that will prosecute them.11
Obviously, these conventions do not solve the problem of non-co-
operative states, and expecting such states to become parties to the
conventions may be excessively hopeful. However, if the great ma-
jority of states become parties (as has happened in the cases of the
conventions on hijacking and aerial sabotage), the pressures on a
few recalcitrant states may prove effective. Underlying that as-
sumption is the hope that states generally will perceive their com-
mon interest in punishing criminal acts that threaten all of them.
If these conventions prove ineffective, some countermeasures
against the countries of refuge may be necessary. Suspension of air
flights, trade and financial embargoes, and curtailment of travel
rights are among the nonforcible measures available against a state
which by support of or complicity with terrorists violates its inter-
national obligation toward all states.111
Recapitulation. In short, under existing law an armed attack
is a basic condition of legitimate self-defense. That requirement
may be reasonably construed to include both an imminent attack
(as defined earlier) and indirect attacks. Unlawful acts that involve
these uses of force, as well as direct attacks, give rise to the right to
take forcible defensive action.
By and large, states profess adherence to the restrictive view
112 See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hi-
jacking), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/
L.23 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.N. JuRmicAL Y.B. 124; see also Convention to Prevent and
Punish Acts of Terrorism, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No.
8413 (adopted by the United States and six Latin American states in 1976).
13 For example, see the recent U.N. General Assembly resolution on measures to pre-
vent international terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, (Dec. 1985), and Security Council Resolution
579 (Dec. 1985) on international terrorism.
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of self-defense. They do not resort to force-or claim the right to
such recourse-merely because a state has violated customary law
or, for example, a treaty pertaining to treatment of nationals. Even
when a state is labeled an "outlaw" for its gross or continuing
breaches of clear rules of law, aggrieved states rarely assert a right
to use force unilaterally, except in response to a prior use of force.
Underlying this manifest reluctance of the community of states to
legitimate forcible self-help is the conclusion, based on historical
experience, that individual use of force is more likely in the end to
jeopardize than to support the effort to obtain effective law.
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF FORCE FOR HIGHER ENDS
The comments just made apply also to suggestions that indi-
vidual states should be permitted to use force to achieve major po-
litical or moral ends.114 These suggestions fall within the concep-
tion of "just war" and resemble some of the classical efforts to
place the legality of war on a moral plane.11 5 There are several var-
iants of this general attitude but one is of particular interest today.
It would allow force to be used when necessary to achieve self-
determination, whether that involves freedom from foreign domi-
nation or freedom from repressive and tyrannical government.1 6
This position, it is interesting to observe, was once taken by
spokesmen for newly independent and Third World states. They
argued that wars of national liberation were not only legal under
international law (a point generally conceded), but that other
states had a right and even a duty to use force to assist the libera-
tion effort.1 1 7 Western states contested this argument as violating
the basic norms of non-intervention and non-use of force.1 8 More
recently, U.S. writers who tend to be identified with conservative
opinion have asserted that democratic states are entitled to use
armed force to overthrow tyranny elsewhere and to bring about
popular democratic rule." 9
114 See J. STONE, supra note 36.
115 See, e.g., W. O'BRIEN, supra note 62, at 13-35; WAR, MORALITY AND THE MILITARY
PROFESSION, supra note 62, at 237-487.
116 See Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4),
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
1'7 See, e.g., Firmage, The "War of National Liberation" and the Third World, in
CIVIL WAR, supra note 101, at 317-23 (discussing Soviet and Chinese statements to this
effect); see also Cohen, China and Intervention: Theory and Practice, id. at 376; Butler,
Soviet Attitudes Toward Intervention, id. at 380-98.
I1 See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 39, at 483-86.
119 See, e.g., Will, The Perils of Legality, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1984, at 84
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One international law scholar has declared that article 2(4) of
the Charter is only a "means," which must yield to the higher pur-
pose of self-rule. Self-determination in his view is the "key postu-
late of political legitimacy in the 20th century." 120 A similar posi-
tion has been articulated in the U.S. by commentators who
supported the U.S. military action in Grenada. They assert that
such action was legitimate because it was aimed at overthrowing a
repressive government and bringing about democracy and freedom.
Although this was not one of the stated legal justifications put for-
ward by the U.S. government, many have considered it the real
and better reason.1"' Similar contentions are being made in favor
of taking military steps to overthrow the non-democratic regime in
Nicaragua.
This argument clearly appeals to the widespread sentiment
that repressive and tyrannical regimes should be overthrown and
that in many cases this "higher end" warrants the use of force.
Moral reasons, whether based on utilitarian-welfare premises or
the inherent dignity of human persons, have been advanced in sup-
port of that sentiment. 11 2 From a legal standpoint, however,
neither the U.N. Charter nor the extensive government commen-
tary thereon supports an interpretation subordinating the basic
prohibition against unilateral use of force to ends other than self-
defense or U.N. enforcement action.
Significantly, except for some oratorical flourishes, the U.S.
has never claimed a right to intervene forcibly to bring about dem-
ocratic government. In regard to Vietnam and, currently, Nicara-
gua, the United States has justified its intervention as a necessary
response to illegal use of force and therefore as justified under the
collective defense provision of article 5.123 In Grenada it presented
other legal grounds but did not rely upon the right to introduce
popular rule there or elsewhere.124 Whatever the merits of these
various grounds, it is noteworthy that the U.S. has not declared
that Charter article 2(4) may be suspended or ignored in the inter-
("[I]nternational law. . . is an intramural code, useful among nations that share common
values but not germane to dealings with totalitarian or gangster regimes."); see also Kristol,
International Law and International Lies, Wall St. J., June 21, 1985, at 26, col. 4.
120 Reisman, supra note 116, at 643.
'2' See, e.g., Kristol, supra note 119, at 26, col. 4.
"' See N. PODHORETZ, supra note 70, at 86-101.
"' See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 169, 191-99 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (presenting U.S. position on Nicaragua).
124 For the list of justifications offered by the United States, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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est of "higher" political goals. Nor for that matter has any other
state.
The position of governments in this respect cannot be attrib-
uted to legalism or a desire to .pay rhetorical deference to the
Charter.12 5 A more fundamental reason goes back to the point I
stressed -earlier-that it is incompatible with the concept of a plu-
ralist society of independent states to allow states to attack each
other in order to impose a particular form of government. It is no
answer to this to maintain that force should be allowed only to
bring about a goal, such as self-determination, which all states pro-
fess to accept. Nor is it an answer to say that the force used would
be proportionate to the end. These justifications ignore the reali-
ties of a world deeply divided about the meaning of democracy and
self-determination. Powerful states would be given a virtually un-
limited right to overthrow governments alleged to be unresponsive
to the "true" will of the people. One side's favored test of self-rule
would not be acceptable to the other side. The weakness and
politicization of collective institutions enhance the danger that ide-
ological confrontation will turn into clashes of military force. Most
responsible governments, I believe, recognize these dangers. They
are not likely to "reinterpret" the Charter so as to increase those
risks.
CONCLUSION
No one, it is safe to say, is satisfied with the present state of
international law on the use of force. Only a raving optimist could
expect a transformation in the foreseeable future to the system of
enforceable law envisaged in the rhetoric of Nuremberg. We now
realize that the bright line between aggression and defense, so clear
in Nuremberg and Tokyo, can be blurred in conflicts over compet-
ing rights. Agreement on words, solemnly affirmed, has repeatedly
dissolved under the pressure of divergent interests and percep-
tions. Neither governments nor their peoples are ready, by and
large, to entrust their security and vital interest to foreign judges
or international organs. The nation-state, whatever its deficiencies,
represents for most peoples the primary source of identity and pro-
tection. The legacies of history and the long pre-civilized past have
left a common "syndrome of parochialism" 12 6 in which distrust of
25 But see D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The "Academic" and the
"Real," 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 662 (arguing that government justifications for interventions
comport with academic versions of the law, even though their real reasons differ).
126 Lasswell, Introduction: Universality Versus Parochialism, to M. McDOUGAL & F.
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strangers and expectations of violence contribute to a climate of
mutual fear. In that climate armed defense, a felt necessity, carries
with it the threat of offense. Clashes of interest or of ideology turn
into covert or open tests of force. Rules of law are bound to appear
fragile in the face of these realities.
Yet a stable society of sovereign states cannot exist if each is
free to destroy the independence of another. Nor can we reasona-
bly contemplate, in the present conditions of power, that either of
the superpowers could impose its rule by coercion on the rest of
the world or establish a condominium of shared authority over the
globe. Their ruling elites are surely aware of the supreme risks to
their survival in the event of a major clash of arms. The legal con-
straints on unilateral recourse to force reflect this reality. They are
not solely the product of moral sentiment.
It is appropriate, of course, to point to the inadequacies of
these constraints and the failures of the existing system. Perhaps it
is time to "demand a miracle," as Richard Falk has suggested, 127
and call for a truly global community that transcends the state sys-
tem. I do not minimize the value of a vision of world order that
looks beyond the present reality. "In dreams begin responsibili-
ties," and it is not too soon to undertake the responsibilities of
moving toward the dream of a demilitarized cooperative world so-
ciety. But it is dangerous to cite the inadequacies of the present
system as reasons for abandoning the basic restraints on the use of
force. Neither the failures of the U.N. nor the violations of its
Charter can justify a "realpolitik" that would allow states once
again to wage war freely. It is foolish and perilous to conclude that
infringements by some have, under principles of reciprocity, freed
all from a rule so fundamental and essential to a stable world or-
der. "Tit for tat" responses may help sustain some international
rules, but to apply this approach to the basic rule on force is a
path to anarchy.
That basic rule, as I have sought to show, is not simply an
abstraction viewed as an ideal. It has evolved into a reasonably co-
herent set of principles and precepts derived from the Charter and
a network of agreements. Much still remains to be done, but when
we look back to Nuremberg and San Francisco in 1945, it is strik-
ing how the abstract notions of that time have been made concrete
to cope with situations barely envisaged then.
FELICIANO, supra note 83, at xxi.
12 Falk, The Quest for World Order: The Legacy of Optimism Re-Examined, 9 DAL-
HOUSiE L.J. 132, 148 (1984); see also RICHARD FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER 25-32 (1983).
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This process has also helped to counteract states' self-serving
unilateral interpretations of the rules. For along with more specific
rules have come collective judgments made inside and outside of
international institutions. The states that have recourse to force
cannot escape these judgments. To be sure, a nonbinding condem-
nation or rebuke does not have the enforceability of a judicial deci-
sion in a national court. But that is not to say that such critical
judgments are without effect. Censure carries with it political costs.
Those costs are not trivial, as shown by the intense efforts of gov-
ernments to avoid censure and to demonstrate the legitimacy of
their conduct. At times unilateralism may be tempting, especially
for powerful states. The International Court of Justice may be de-
fied by non-appearance. The condemnation of the General Assem-
bly may be passed off with a quip. But in the end such unilateral-
ism is bound to exact a steep price, by making it impossible to
maintain the rules of co-existence necessary to avoid catastrophe.
